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Legislation Affecting the Civil Code
Paul M. Hebert* and Carlos E. Lazarust
Amendments to Specific Articles
Article 92-Amendment relative to waiver of age limitations
on marriage. Under Article 92, as it originally appeared in the
Revised Civil Code of 1870, ministers of the Gospel and magis-
trates, entrusted with the power of celebrating marriages, were
prohibited from marrying any male under the age of fourteen
years or any female under the age of twelve.' These minimum
age limits, based on puberty, were changed in 1934 from fourteen
to eighteen years for males and from twelve to sixteen years
for females. 2 Section 2 of Act 140 of 1934, which made the
changes in the minimum age limit did not become a part of the
Civil Code. This section provided for waiver of the age limita-
tions on application made to any district judge by either of the
parties to a proposed marriage. Under the statute, exception
from the age limitations was authorized upon satisfactory evi-
dence being presented to the judge, "in case of extraordinary
circumstances when the parents or guardians of the parties to
the proposed marriage give their consent." The statute did not
define what constituted "extraordinary circumstances," but did
specifically provide that the evidence be received in chambers,
that the order "shall not contain the reasons for authorizing the
marriage," and that the application would not be a matter of
record but would be attached to the marriage certificate.8 This
exception of the 1934 act vested a broad discretion in the district
judge and was obviously designed to avert hardships that might
arise in a wide variety of circumstances should the increased
minimum age be applied without consideration of the facts of
particular situations. The authorized exception took cognizance
of the fact that there were extraordinary circumstances in which
Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
Coordinator of Research, Louisiana State Law Institute; Part-time
Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See Comment, The Validity of Child Marriages in Louisiana, 14 TULANE
L. REV. 106 (1939); Connor, Child Marriages in Louisiana-Another Word,
4 LOYOLA L. REV. 150 (1948).
2. Art. 92, LA. CiviL CODE of 1870, as amended and re-enacted, La. Acts
1934, No. 140, § 1, p. 497. Art. 36, LA. CviL CODE of 1870, defines the age of
puberty.
3. See La. Acts 1934, No. 140, § 2, p. 497.
10]
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it would be far sounder social policy to authorize the marriage
than to adhere to the age limitation that marriage celebrants
are directed to observe.4 At the time of the 1934 act the status
of marriages contracted in contravention of Article 92 was still
unsettled.5
When the Revised Statutes of 1950 were adopted, Section 2
of Act 140 of 1934 (containing the exception above referred to)
was not enacted as part of the revision. Although Section 2 of
the 1934 act was not specifically repealed by the revision, there
was presented the anomalous situation that the exception to
Article 92 was not a part of the Civil Code and was not re-enacted
in the Revised Statutes. There existed, therefore, some uncer-
tainty as to whether the provision of Section 2 of Act 140 of 1934
was still in effect.
Act 398 of 1954, by amending and re-enacting Article 92, and
by incorporating the amended exception to the operation of the
minimum age limitations as a part of the Civil Code article,
removes any doubt that might have existed as to whether the
former Section 2 of Act 140 of 1934 was still legally effective.,
In this respect, therefore, the amendment and re-enactment of
Article 92 is a desirable clarification of the law.
4. For a discussion of the policy considerations on which the judicial
discretion is based see Connor, Child Marriages in Louisana-Another Word,
4 LOYOLA L. REV. 150, 155 (1948).
5. In State v. Golden, 210 La. 347, 26 So.2d 837 (1946), 7 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 442 (1947), the court sustained the validity of a marriage of a girl
fifteen years of age who married without her parents' consent. See State v.
Priest, 210 La. 389, 27 So.2d 173 (1946), affirming State v. Golden by implica-
tion. In In re State in Interest of Goodwin, 214 La. 1062, 39 So.2d 731 (1949),
marriage of a fourteen-year old girl was held valid although in violation of
Art. 92, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, prohibiting magistrates and ministers from
marrying any female under the age of sixteen and although in violation
of statute providing for a waiting period of seventy-two hours following the
issuance of a license during which period ministers and magistrates are pro-
hibited from performing marriages. For a discussion of the French Civil
Code provisions (Arts. 144 and 156) see Comment, The Validity of Child
Marriages in Louisiana, 14 TULANE L. REV. 106 (1939).
6. Art. 92, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, as amended and re-enacted, La. Acts
1954, No. 398, § 1 now reads: "Provided, that this act shall not apply, when
on application of either of the parties to a proposed marriage, any district
judge, except, in the Parish of Orleans, any judge of the First City Court
of the City of New Orleans, may, upon satisfactory evidence being presented
to him, in case of extraordinary circumstances when the parents or guardians
of the parties to the proposed marriage give their consent, provided, how-
ever, that said evidence shall be presented in chambers, and provided also,
that said order shall not contain the reasons for authorizing said marriage,
and the application shall not be a matter of record but the order shall be
attached to and made part of the marriage certificate." (Italicized words
added by the 1954 amendment.) ,
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It is to be noted that, in the re-enactment of Article 92, the
exception provision was not altered in its main substantive pro-
visions. A change was made to provide that on the application
for waiver of the age limitation any district judge "except, in the
Parish of Orleans, any judge of the First City Court of the City
of New Orleans," may authorize the marriage. While the pro-
vision is not completely free from ambiguity, it seems clear that
the statute has the effect of depriving judges of the Civil District
Court in the Parish of Orleans of the authority to set aside the
age limitations and the authority is vested instead in the First
City Court in New Orleans.7 The wisdom of departing from the
prior law under which all district judges could issue an order in
appropriate cases, authorizing the marriage despite the age
limitation, seems open to question.8
A statute adopted in 1950 established a waiting period of
seventy-two hours between the issuance of a marriage license
and the performance of the marriage ceremony and made it un-
lawful for any minister or public officer to perform the marriage
ceremony during that period. Exceptions to the waiting period
requirement were permitted upon a certificate from a district
judge who had discretion, after interviewing the parties, to
authorize for serious and meritorious reasons immediate perform-
ance of the marriage. The certificate of the district judge for
any such exception was required to be attached to the return on
the marriage certificate.9 Act 399 amends these statutory provi-
sions to provide in each instance that the waiver of the seventy-
two hour waiting period statute is to be issued in the City of
New Orleans by the judges of the First City Court instead of by
the district judges. 10 The amendment to these sections of the
Revised Statutes corresponds to the change made by its corn-
7. Another possible construction would be that civil district court judges
may still issue the waiver order, but judges of the First City Court in New
Orleans may also issue it. The clause "except, in the Parish of Orleans"
would more properly be considered as modifying the term "any district
judge." See the statute quoted in note 6 supra.
8. The large number of such matters presented to the civil district
courts was, no doubt, the reason for transferring the function to the City
Court in New Orleans. But added justification is found in the functions of
the City Court of New Orleans in the issuance of marriage licenses and the
celebration of marriages. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 91.
9. LA. R.S. 9:203-206 (1950).
10. In LA. R.S. 9:204-206 (1950), after the authority mentioned in the
district judge in each section, there was inserted the qualifying language:
"except, in the Parish of Orleans, any judge of the First City Court of the
City of New Orleans."
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panion legislation in the provision which is now Article 92 of
the Civil Code."
Articles 138 and 139-Conviction of a felony and sentence to
imprisonment at hard labor or death as grounds for separation
or divorce. In Hull v. Donze12 the Supreme Court held that
Article 139 of the Civil Code which provides that either spouse
may obtain a divorce when the other spouse has been "sentenced
to an infamous punishment" means that to satisfy this require-
ment a sentence to imprisonment at hard labor or death must
have been imposed. The test of whether or not a punishment is
infamous, therefore, depends upon the nature of the sentence
imposed and it was specifically held that sentence to imprison-
ment in a parish jail is not an "infamous punishment" within
the meaning of Article 139."3 It is clear that the holding in Hull
v. Donze would be equally applicable to Article 138(2) of the
Civil Code which provides separation from bed and board may
be claimed "when the other spouse has been condemned to an
infamous punishment. ' 14 By two separate acts, the 1954 legis-
lature amends Articles 138 (2) and 139 to clarify these grounds
for separation and divorce by expressly providing that conviction
of a felony and sentence to death or to imprisonment at hard
labor in the state or in a federal penitentiary shall constitute the
requisite grounds. The vague terms of condemnation and sen-
tence "to an infamous punishment" have been eliminated in
favor of the more exact phraseology above referred to.15 In the
11. Under the jurisprudence, even where the waiting period is dis-
regarded and the requisite authorization for immediate marriage not ob-
tained, a marriage in contravention of these statutory provisions is never-
theless valid. In re State in the Interest of Goodwin, 214 La. 1062, 39 So.2d
731 (1949).
12. 164 La. 199, 113 So. 816 (1927).
13. See Comment, Divorce in Louisiana: Grounds and Defenses, 24 Tu-
LANE L. REV. 443, 444 (1950).
14. Art. 138(2), LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; compare Article 138(7) which lists
as an additional ground for separation: "When the husband or wife has been
charged with an infamous offense, and shall actually have fled from justice,
the wife or husband of such fugitive may claim a separation from bed and
board, on producing proofs to the judge before whom the action for separa-
tion is brought, that such husband or wife has actually been guilty of such
infamous offense, and has fled from justice."
15. La. Acts 1954, No. 617, amending Arts. 138(2), (7), LA. CIVIL CODE of
1870, provides that separation may be claimed reciprocally: "2. When the
other spouse has been convicted of a felony and sentenced to death or to
imprisonment at hard labor in the state or federal penitentiary;" and "7.
When the husband or wife has been charged with a felony, and shall actu-
ally have fled from justice" upon proof that the spouse who has fled from
justice "has actually been guilty of such felony." Under Art. 139, LA. CIVIL
CODE of 1870, as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 618, Immediate divorce may now
be claimed for the cause of "Conviction of the other spouse of a felony and
his sentence to death or imprisonment at hard labor."
[VOL. XV
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light of the jurisprudence, this phase of the amendments is merely
an enactment of the existing rule.16
Article 138-Intentional nonsupport as grounds for separa-
tion. In amending Article 138, Act 617 adds to the previously
enumerated causes an entirely new ground for separation from
bed and board:
"8. On account of the intentional non-support by the hus-
band of his wife who is in destitute or necessitous circum-
stances, or by the wife of her husband who is in destitute
or necessitous circumstances."
A number of American jurisdictions have by statute recog-
nized nonsupport by the husband as grounds for divorce or
separation. 7 By this amendment Louisiana has broadened con-
siderably the grounds under which separation, usually the pre-
lude to divorce, may be obtained. This act continues the un-
desirable trend of making it easier to dissolve the bonds of a
civil marriage. Similar legislative policy, indicating the more
lenient attitude toward divorce, is reflected in the history of
the seven-year divorce law under which the requisite time of
living separate and apart has been progressively shortened to two
years.' In recognizing intentional nonsupport as grounds for
16. The Louisiana Criminal Code defines a felony as "any crime for
which an offender may be sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor."
LA. R.S. 14:2 (1950). Generally, a sentence to the parish jail could not be a
sentence to imprisonment at hard labor. There has been some conjecture
that possibility of imprisonment at hard labor might exist if the parish
should have a work farm or other means of providing hard labor. Any
uncertainty on this point does not affect the meaning of Arts. 138(2), 139,
LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, as amended, because it is required that there be (1)
conviction of a felony, and (2) sentence to death or imprisonment at hard
labor in the state penitentiary or in a federal penitentiary. In MACKAY, LAW
OF MARRIAGE AND *DIVORCE SIMPLIFIED 69 (2d ed. 1951), forty-three American
jurisdictions are listed as recognizing conviction for a felony as grounds for
divorce. The question may very well be raised as to whether there might be
some situations which, though falling within the amendment, ought not to
be included as grounds for divorce. There are some lesser crimes for which
imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed and which may not have been
within the contemplation of the court when it construed "infamous punish-
ment" as used in the article of the Code. See LA. R.S. 14:56 (1950) (simple
damage to property to the value of $500); LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950) (theft to the
value of $20 but less than $100); LA. R.S. 14:69 (1950) (receiving stolen prop-
erty to the value of $20 but less than $100); LA. R.S. 14:71 (1950) as amended
by La. Acts 1954, No. 442, § 1 (issuing worthless checks for less than $100);
LA. R.S. 14:209 (1950) (breaking seals without authority which have been
legally affixed to succession property).
17. MACKAY, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE SIMPLIFIED 70 (2d ed. 1951) lists
twenty-seven jurisdictions as recognizing nonsupport by the husband as
grounds for divorce.
18. LA. R.S. 9:301 (1950) allowing divorce when the spouses have been
living separate and apart started with a seven-year term, La. Acts 1916, No.
269, p. 557, which was reduced to four years by La. Acts 1932, No. 31, p. 217,
and then reduced to two years by La. Acts 1938, No. 430, p. 1091.
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divorce, the legislature was probably influenced by the state of
the law under which a wife, during the marriage, was actually
without an effective civil remedy to enforce the legal duty of
the husband to support her. 19 True, she might demand support
as an incident to a criminal action charging her husband with
intentional nonsupport;20 but if a wife did not desire to file such
criminal charges against her husband, she had no civil remedy.
This follows from the interpretation that has been placed upon
Article 105 of the Code of Practice prohibiting suits between
husband and wife during the existence of the marriage. If the
husband had abandoned the wife, a suit for alimony as an inci-
dent to a pending action for.separation on that ground could be
maintained; 21 but for intentional nonsupport unaccompanied by
desertion the wife had no remedy. Moreover, the right of the
husband to proceed against the wife for support is not recognized
under the Criminal Neglect of Family Act.22 The remedy effected
by the 1954 statute in the enlargement of the grounds for separa-
tion to include intentional nonsupport accomplishes the result
of providing a reciprocal remedy for intentional nonsupport in
cases in which there is no abandonment of one of the spouses by
the other. There is some safeguard in the requirement that the
nonsupport must be "intentional" which exacts that the non-
support be knowing and willful and clearly excludes a case of
inability to provide. Similarly, the requirement that the non-
supported spouse be in "destitute or necessitous circumstances"
indicates legislative intent to restrict the application of the new
provision to cases of real destitution. If the objective was to
19. Carroll v. Carroll, 42 La. Ann. 1071, 8 So. 400(1890) held that, during
the existence of the marriage, a wife could not sue for support or alimony
unless such suit were accompanied by a demand for separation from bed
and board, or divorce. The decision was based upon Art. 105, LA. CODE OF
PRACTI E of 1870, providing that "a married woman cannot sue her husband
as long as the marriage continues, except it be to obtain a separation from
bed and board. ... The court reasoned that this provision coupled with
the failure of the Civil Code to authorize specifically an action for support
excluded the possibility of such an action. Arts. 119, 120, LA. CIVIL CODE of
1870, recognize the duty of support, but do not provide a remedy for its
enforcement.
20. Arts. 74, 75, LA. CRIM. COD (1942) dealing with criminal neglect of
family, LA. R.S. 14:74-75 (1950). Under these provisions a wife who does not
want to divorce or judicially separate from her husband may secure sup-
port in addition to the penalties to which the husband is subject for criminal
neglect of family. See Zaccaria v. Beoubay, 213 La. 782, 35 So.2d 659 (1948).
21. Arts. 138(5), 148, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. See Keir v. Digby, 166 La.
92, 97, 116 So. 711, 712 (1928): "The failure to take care of one's wife and
children is a dereliction of duty and a breach of the contract of marriage,
but it cannot be said to be a legal cause for separation from bed and board."
22. LA. R.S. 14:75 (1950) makes It clear that the defendant referred to
is the husband who is required to furnish support to the wife and children.
[VOtL. XV
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provide the spouses with a civil action to enforce the obligation
of mutual support when one of the spouses is in necessitous cir-
cumstances, the direct approach of providing such action by way
of exception to Code of Practice Article 105 would appear to be
sounder social policy than adding to the grounds for separation
and eventually divorce.
Article 2635-Appointment of a curator ad hoc for a defen-
dant in expropriation proceedings though he might be within
the state, if he cannot be located. Article 2635 is part of the
chapter of the Civil Code entitled "Of the Compulsory Transfer
of Property. '2 rit provides that in proceedings to expropriate
property belonging to an absent or unknown owner, the court
must appoint a curator ad hoc to represent such owner. The
word "absent" meaning "absent from the state,"24 prior to Act
47 of 195425 the article did not authorize proceedings to continue
if the owner was within the state but could not be located. As
amended by that act, the article requires the appointment of a
curator ad hoc in three instances: (1) if the owner is unknown,
(2) if the owner is absent without leaving a known agent within
the state, (3) "if he cannot be found and served after diligent
effort though he may still reside within the state. '26
A second noteworthy change was enacted into Article 2635
by Act 47. Before amendment, the article provided that in a
proceeding against property whose owner was represented by a
curator ad hoc, the price of the property being expropriated must
be deposited into the state treasury and thus become subject to
the order of the State Treasurer. The amendment requires that
the price be deposited with the court which is conducting the
expropriation proceedings, and become subject to the order of
that court. This change will apparently facilitate the procedure
and is in accordance with the method followed in most states.2 7
Article 3194-Maximum allowable for funeral charges where
estate is insolvent increased to $500. Article 3193 provides that
when the estate of a deceased is insolvent, the funeral charges
may, upon request by other creditors, be reduced by the judge
to a reasonable rate, "regard being had to the station in life
which the deceased held and which his family holds." Act 114 of
23. Bk. III, tit. VII, c. 11, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
24. Art. 3556(3), LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870. See also Hill & McGunnegle v.
Bowman, 14 La. 445 (1840).
25. Art. 2635, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870, as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 47, § 1.
26. Ibid.
27. JAHR, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN VALUATION AND PROCEDURE 300 (1953).
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1954,28 amending Article 3194 provides that "in case of reduction"
the judge cannot allow more than $500 to pay funeral and burial
expenses; prior to amendment, this maximum was $200. While
Article 3193 appears to leave to the discretion of the court the
question of whether there will be a reduction of the charges, it
has been held that the maximum amount payable for funeral
charges as specified in Article 3194 must be complied with and
a judgment was amended insofar as the trial judge had refused
to reduce the payment to the maximum allowed.29
Article 3541 - Thirty-year acquisitive prescription to run
against minors, interdicts and nonresidents. By Act 736 of 1954,
Article 3541 of the Civil Code is amended to read as follows:
"The prescriptions mentioned in the preceding article,
and those provided in paragraphs I and II of section three
(3) of Chapter three (3) of this title, and those of thirty
years shall run against married women, minors, and inter-
dicted persons, reserving, however, to minors and interdicted
persons recourse against their tutors or curators.
"These prescriptions shall also run against persons re-
siding out of the State." (Italics supplied.)
The italicized portion of the provision set forth above is added
by the amendment. The effect of the 1954 act is to include the
prescription of thirty years among the prescriptive periods which
are not suspended by minority or other legal incapacity. The act
expressly provides that the amendment shall operate retrospec-
tively as well as prospectively. It further provides that in any
case in which the prescription of thirty years would accrue
within six months of the effective date of the act, no plea of
prescription founded upon the act can be asserted in an action
commenced before the expiration of such six-month period.8 0
Under Articles 3522 and 3554 of the Civil Code, minors and
persons under interdiction cannot be prescribed against except
28. Art. 3194, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, as amended, La. Acts 1954, No, 114,
§ 1.
29. Succession of Holstun, Fleming v. First Nat. Bank in Gibsland, 141 So.
793 (La. App. 1932). See also Payton v. Jones, 38 So.2d 631 (La. App. 1949).
30. La. Acts 1954, No. 736, § 2. Such a statute, though retrospective in
its operation, is not unconstitutional as divesting vested rights or impairing
the obligations of contracts. It is only necessary that a reasonable time be
allowed to assert rights that are affected by the changed prescriptive period
and it has been held that the courts will not interfere with the legislative
determination of the reasonableness of time unless it Is so short as to amount
to a denial of justice. See Cooper v. Lykes, 218 La. 251, 49 So.2d 3 (1950)
and cases therein cited. See also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Courtfor the 1950-1951 Term-Constitutional Law, 12 LOUISIANA LAw REvIEW 157,
160 (1952).
[VOL. XV
1954] LEGISLATION AFFECTING CIVIL CODE 17
in those cases expressly provided for by law. In the leading case
of Tyler v. Lewis,81 the Supreme Court, construing the various
articles on prescription, held that the cases in which prescription
does not run against minors are specified in Article 3541 and con-
cluded that in the absence of any specified exception, the pre-
scription of thirty years does not run against minors.3 2 This
result was clearly a correct interpretation and was in harmony
with the basic philosophy of the Civil Code of 1870 which con-
sidered it socially desirable to protect the interest of the minor
in preference to the competing interest of society in achieving
certainty through liberative and acquisitive prescription.33
The attitude of protecting the minor's interests began to
lose ground as balanced against practical difficulties arising when
such interests were encountered in a chain of title to real estate.
In 1920, the legislature provided that the ten-year acquisitive
prescription founded upon possession in good faith under a title
translative of ownership3 4 would run against interdicts, married
women, absentees and all others excepted by law. As to the
effect of minority, the amended Code provision states:
... as to minors this prescription shall accrue in twenty-
two years from the date of birth of said minor; provided that
this prescription once it has begun to run against a party
shall not be interrupted in favor of any minor heirs of said
party."35
Subsequent legislation of 1944 and 1950 provided that the accrual
of the ten-years' liberative prescription of a mineral servitude
for non-user shall not be suspended or interrupted because of
the minority or other legal disability of any owner.36 This legis-
lation did not change the basic rule as declared in Tyler v. Lewis.
In the interest of settling titles to real estate where the acquisi-
31. 143 La. 229, 78 So. 477 (1918).
32. Rankin, Tutor v. Bell, 2 La. Ann. 486 (1847) wherein It was held that
the prescription of thirty years against an action of partition not suspended
during the minority of the heir was expressly overruled by Tyler v. Lewis,
143 La. 229, 78 So. 477 (1918).
33. For a scholarly analysis of the legal conceptions underlying the rules
relative to the suspension of prescription during minority and a comparison
with French civil law, see Zengel, Influences of Minority Upon the Accrual of
Prescription, 13 TULANE L. REV. 123 (1938).
34. Art. 3479, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870 establishes the conditions which must
be met by one claiming the ten years acquisitive prescription.
35. Art, 3478, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870, as amended, La. Acts 1920, No. 161,
p. 251, La. Acts 1924, No. 64, p. 91.
36. LA. R.S. 9:5805 (1950) incorporating La. Acts 1944, No. 232, p. 687,
La. Acts 1950, No. 510, p. 935, into the revision. For the background of the
1944 act, see James v. Noble, 214 La. 196, 36 So.2d 722 (1948); Sample v.
Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931).
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tive prescription of thirty years would not run against persons
under legal incapacity, the 1954 act now makes it clear that all
thirty-year prescriptions are included within the provisions of
Article 3541.37 It is to be noted, however, that for actions which
prescribe in ten years, Article 3541, as amended, makes no pro-
vision and the original principle of the Code which contemplates
suspension of prescription during legal incapacity is therefore
still applicable to any such liberative prescription.3 8
Articles 2634, 3518, 3519-Amended. These amendments are
of a procedural nature and are discussed in the commentary on
Courts and Judicial Procedure in this survey.3 9
Civil Code Ancillaries
Marriage licenses-Amendment to requirement of medical
certificate. Under provisions of the Revised Statutes, it was
unlawful for any officer authorized to issue marriage licenses to
issue such a license to a male applicant unless the application
was supported by a proper medical certificate dated within fifteen
days prior to the application showing the applicant to be free
from venereal disease. 40 Such medical examination as a pre-
requisite to marriage was exacted of the man, but not of the
woman. 41 By Act 284 the requirement as to medical examination
and certification of freedom from venereal disease is broadened to
require that both the male and female applicants shall file such a
certificate. 42 The act requires that the medical certificate be dated
within seven days prior to the application instead of the fifteen
days allowed under the previous act. The amendment is a marked
37. It is to be noted that Article 3541 is a part of Section 3 of Chapter 3
of the Civil Code which treats of liberative prescription. Article 3548 estab-
lishes a liberative prescription of thirty years as to actions for immovable
property, or for the recovery of an estate or a succession. The jurisprudence
establishes that this article is merely the counterpart and an affirmance
of Article 3499 by which ownership of immovable property is acquired by
thirty years' possession. Labarre v. Rateau, 210 La. 34, 26 So.2d 279 (1946)
and cases therein cited. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the 1954
amendment, though not mentioning acquisitive prescription, includes within
its scope both Articles 3499 and 3548 of the Civil Code.
38. The effect of the 1954 amendment to Article 3541 and LA. R.S. 9:5805
(1950) is that minority and other legal incapacities do not suspend or inter-
rupt the following prescriptive periods: (1) the one-year periods which are
named in Bk. III, tit. 23, c. 3, § 3, par. 1, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; (2) the three-
year periods named in Bk. III, tit. 23, c. 3, § 3, par. 2, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870;
(3) the five-year period applicable to actions on bills and notes; (4) all thirty-
year prescriptive periods; (5) the ten-year periods insofar as they affect
mineral rights. The legislation does not affect the action of the minor
against his tutor for any dereliction of duty.
39. See page 42 infra for a discussion of La. Acts 1954, Nos. 705, 615, 532.
40. LA. R.S. 9:241-242 (1950).
41. OPs. ATT'Y GEN. LA. 337 (1944-46).
42. La. Acts 1954, No. 284, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 9:241-242 (1950).
[VOL. XV
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improvement upon the earlier law which had been in effect since
1924 and reflects a progressive attitude toward safeguarding the
health and happiness of the home. It is legislation long overdue.43
Divorce-Uniform Divorce Recognition Act repealed. Act 61644
repeals Act 241 of 1952, through which Louisiana became the
ninth state to adopt the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act.45 The
previous act was originally recommended in 1948 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in an effort
to combat the practice of "migratory divorces" by which residents
of one state journey to a state with more lenient laws with the
avowed purpose of acquiring a new domicile in order to obtain
a "quickie divorce." Sections 1 and 2 of the Uniform Act declared
(1) that a divorce obtained outside of Louisiana "shall be of no
force or effect in this state" if both of the parties were domiciled
in Louisiana at the commencement of the suit; and (2) that a
person who obtained a divorce in another state shall prima facie
be presumed to have been domiciled in Louisiana at the time he
commenced the proceedings if he was domiciled here within
twelve months before suit and returned to Louisiana within
eighteen months after his departure or if he maintained a resi-
dence in Louisiana during the time of his absence.4
While the public dissatisfaction with the situation created
by migratory divorces and the policy of discouragement reflected
in the Uniform Act are entirely commendable, the problem dealt
with is one of the most complex areas in the conflict of laws. 47 In
43. The need for this amendment was pointed out some twenty years
ago by Professor Harriet S. Daggett. See Daggett, Trends in Louisiana Law
of the Family, 9 TULANE L. REV. 89, 92-93 (1934).
44. La. Acts 1954, No. 616, repealing LA. R.S. 9:351-354 (Supp. 1952).
45. 9 U.L.A. 124 (Supp. 1953). The background of the Uniform Divorce
Recognition Act and its rationale are set forth in the Commissioners' Notes,
9 U.L.A. 364-75 (1951).
46. LA. R.S. 9:352-353 (1950), constituting La. Acts 1952, No. 241, §§ 1, 2,
p. 588.
47. Since Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), it has been
clear that full faith and credit need not be given a divorce granted in a
state not the domicile of one of the parties. A divorce decree, obtained
upon a false representation of domicile, is not entitled to full faith and
credit, and the lack of jurisdictional prerequisite may be shown in a pro-
ceeding in another state, despite recital in the decree of the existence of
domicile. This case, along with Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287
(1942), and the subsequent cases of Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948)
and Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948), gives rise to perplexing questions under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution which has
evoked widespread consideration of scholars in the field of conflict of laws.
For a recent discussion of this problem, see Comment, Jurisdiction to Divorce
Non-Domiciliary Plaintiffs, 14 LOuIsIANA LAW REVIEW 257 (1953); The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1958 Term-Persons, 14 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 114-116 (1953).
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spite of the attempt of the framers to fit the act into the doctrinal
pattern set by Williams v. North Carolina48 serious question
exists as to whether Section 1 of the Uniform Act actually accom-
plishes anything. This section may be regarded as bad legislation
because it necessarily implies a power in Louisiana to recognize
an out-of-state migratory divorce when both parties are domi-
ciled in Louisiana.49 Furthermore, Section 2 of the act is subject
to the criticism that it pays only lip service to the concept of
domicile and by adopting presumptions for determination of the
fact of domicile oversteps the limits permissible under present
constitutional doctrine.5, In the important case of Alton v. Alton5 l
the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to provide
definitive answers to some of the questions inherent in the
Uniform Act, but the case was dismissed as presenting moot
issues.
It is understood that the repeal of the Uniform Act was not
prompted by technical legal considerations in the area of conflict
of laws. The repeal seems to have been due to apprehension as
to the possible clouds on titles to property that could be created
as a result of the Louisiana Uniform Act. If property settlements
were effected on the basis of an out-of-state divorce decree, the
presumptions of invalidity of the divorce proceedings resulting
from Section 2 of the act would raise serious problems as to the
48. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
49. Section 1 of the Uniform Act must have been enacted in the belief
that Louisiana has the power, if it wished, to recognize out-of-state divorces
even though both parties were domiciled in Louisiana at the time of the
institution of the proceedings. It is arguable that no such power exists
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. If the state is powerless to do
otherwise than to deny recognition to a divorce granted where neither party
has a domicile, Section 1 of the Uniform Act is useless.
50. See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), 14 LOuIsIANA LAW
RviEw 893 (1954). A statute of the Virgin Islands enacted a legislative prima
facie presumption that a person who had been residing in the Islands for
six weeks was domiciled there and could obtain a divorce there. The Virgin
Islands court refused to grant a divorce to a petitioner who relied upon
the statute for proof of domicile, even though the defendant was present
before the court and did not contest the fact of domicile. The court of
appeals (majority opinion by Goodrich, Circuit Judge) upheld the lower
court on the grounds (1) that domicile 'was a jurisdictional fact without
which a divorce judgment not only would not be entitled to full faith and
credit, but also would not be valid where rendered, and (2) that a state or
territory could not adopt a presumption of domicile, which might not con-
form to the fact of domicile, for otherwise the requirement of domicile
could be avoided. If this decision be correct, it will mean that a state
cannot recognize a divorce judgment granted in a state not that of the
domicile of a party and that a state may not adopt criteria in the form of
presumptions for determining whether it must give full faith and credit to
divorces obtained in sister states.
51. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. granted, 74 Sup. Ct. 478 (1954), dis-
missed upon the ground that the cause was moot, 74 Sup. Ct. 786 (1954).
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validity of titles to such property. The community regime and
the prohibition of transactions between husband and wife during
the existence of the marriage would present difficulties to title
examiners in such situations. The repeal of the Uniform Divorce
Recognition Act will avert such difficulties and because of the
doubtful validity of the act as a whole, no harm appears to have
been done by its repeal.
Adoption-Statute permitting final decree at first hearing
amended. Under the prior law, in adoption proceedings, the
court was permitted in certain circumstances to render a final
decree of adoption at the first hearing without the necessity of an
interlocutory decree. 2 It was apparent from the statute that
one of the basic conditions contemplated that the child to be
adopted should be in the home of the petitioner for six months.
The statute was awkwardly worded and required under some
circumstances that "both the child and the petitioner seeking to
adopt him" have been in the same home for six months to sup-
port a final decree at the first hearing on the adoption. Act 324
of 1954 clarifies the adoption statute in R.S. 9:434. As amended,
the statute now authorizes an adoption decree at the first hearing
if the child has been in the home of the petitioners for at least
six months prior to the adoption petition in the four cases ex-
pressly provided for in the statute. One of the four instances
added by the amendment is that in which a married couple
jointly petitions to adopt a child born out of wedlock to one of
the petitioners. These amendments may have been unnecessary,
but do constitute clarification of the prior law.
Immovable property-Ownership of navigable waters and
beds of bayous, rivers, streams, lagoons, lakes and bays. In
California Company v. Price,5" the Supreme Court held that
while it may be inimical to the public policy of the state to
permit private ownership of the beds of navigable waters, prior
to the Constitution of 1921 there was nothing in the law to pre-
clude the legislature from sanctioning such ownership. The court
held that the land in question, part of Grand Bay in Plaquemines
Parish, had become privately owned under the terms of Act 62
of 1912. That statute established a six-year prescriptive period
within which the state could bring an action to vacate and annul
any patent previously issued over the signature of the Governor
52. LA. R.S. 9:434 (1950).
53. 74 So.2d 1 (La. 1954). The decision was four to three with Chief
Justice Fournet and Justices Ponder and Hawthorne dissenting.
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and the Register of the State Land Office.14 Thus the court
affirmed and followed its previous pronouncement in the so-
called Duck Lake case,55 where it held that the right of the state
to assail a grant to the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District of the
bed of a navigable lake had prescribed by the very terms of Act
62 of 1912. The question presented in these cases was whether
the 1912 act should be interpreted to exclude from its terms any
patents which might embrace the beds or bottoms of navigable
bays and lakes. Despite the previous landmark decision of Miami
Corporation v. State56 and the policy reflected in the Civil Code
sustaining the legal doctrine that beds of navigable waters are
insusceptible of private ownership, these cases rejected the view
that the 1912 act excluded patents that embraced the beds of
navigable waters.
Because these decisions run counter to the policy expressed
in the Civil Code and in the Constitution of 1921,17 and because it
may be cogently argued that the interpretation given to Act 62
of 1912 does violence to the legislative intent,58 it is easily under-
54. The provisions of this act are carried forward into the Revised
Statutes as LA. R.S. 9:5661 (1950) with editorial changes, particularly the
change of the original language previously contained in the statute that
"suits to annul patents previously issued shall be brought within six years
from the passage of this Act."
55. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. State Mineral Board, 223 La. 47, 64
So.2d 839 (1953), 14 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 267, and commented upon in The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1958 Term-Property,
14 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 133-37 (1953).
56. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936). See Arts. 453, 458, LA. CrnVL CODE of
1870.
57. LA. CONST. Art. IV, § 2, provides: "Nor shall the Legislature alienate,
or authorize the alienation of, the fee of the bed of any navigable stream,
lake or other body of water, except for purposes of reclamation. In all cases
the mineral rights on any and all property sold by the State shall be re-
served, except where the owner or other person having the right to redeem
may buy or redeem property sold or adjudicated to the State for taxes."
58. In his dissent, in California Co. v. Price, 74 So.2d 1, 15-16 (La. 1954),
Chief Justice Fournet states: "I have no doubt that if this were an origi-
nal test of legislative intent in adopting Act No. 62 of 1912, the statute
could, despite its all-embracive language, very easily be construed to mean
that the legislature did not intend thereby to include within its purview
the beds of navigable streams, and particularly those connected with or
forming a part of or being an arm of the sea, but only such lands as the
state would, in the ordinary course of events, have available for sale on
the open market. In my opinion, such a construction is logical and sound,
leading to no absurd consequences." See also the dissent of Justice Ponder,
id. at 17: "I believe a reasonable construction of the statute would be that
it only applies to property susceptible of ownership and that it has no
application to property that cannot be owned. Furthermore, the act is a
curative statute and cannot be given the effect of supplying title to the
arm of the sea when the patent itself did not and could not convey any
semblance of title to it."
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standable that the far-reaching effect59 of these decisions would
evoke legislative action during the 1954 sessions. Act 727 of 1954
adding R.S. 9:1107-1109, represents a direct attempt to overrule
the two decisions. The act declares that it has always been the
public policy of the state that all navigable waters and the beds
thereof are insusceptible of private ownership; that no legislative
act has been enacted in contravention of that policy; and that the
intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting Act 62 of 1912
was, and is, to ratify and confirm only those patents which con-
veyed public lands susceptible of private ownership. The act
further declares that any patent or transfer heretofore or here-
after issued or made is null and void, so far as it purports to in-
clude navigable waters and the beds thereof as having been
made in contravention of the announced public policy, and that
no statute shall be construed to validate by reason of prescription
or peremption any patent or transfer issued by the state which
includes "navigable or tide waters or the beds of the same."
As a legislative construction of the act of 1912 intended to
have retrospective effect, Act 727 of 1954 will undoubtedly be
attacked on the grounds that it divests vested rights and con-
stitutes a violation of both state and federal constitutional provi-
sions.60 In Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois6' it was held that a
legislative grant of the state's title to submerged lands under
Lake Michigan could be repealed by subsequent legislation be-
cause the lands in question were held in trust for the public use.6 2
59. At the conclusion of his well-reasoned dissenting opinion reflecting
comprehensive research into the jurisprudence and statutory provisions,
Justice Hawthorne, id. at 29, states: "The decision rendered by the majority
of the court in the instant case is one of far-reaching effect, and it takes
no seer or prophet to foretell that as a result of this decision private Indi-
viduals will successfully claim title under old patents to the beds of nu-
merous bays on the Gulf, large lakes, etc., from which oil is being or will
be produced, and the holding that such properties are susceptible of private
ownership will deprive the people of this State of tremendous sums of money,
running into millions, which, I say with due respect to the views of the
majority, legally belong to them."
60. LA. CONST. Art. IV, § 15; U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 10. It is to be noted
that the majority opinion in California Co. v. Price, 74 So.2d 1, 7 (La. 1954)
stated that the Oyster Statutes relied on by the state as containing pro-
visions that the beds and bottoms of navigable waters continued to be
property of the State of Louisiana could not be considered as applicable
to the 1912 act. In the court's opinion, to construe those statutes as applicable
to previously disposed of property would be to open the statutes to a con-
stitutional attack as divesting divested rights.
61. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
62. ROTTSCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 595, n. 41
(1939), so interprets the cited case, but he points out that generally public
grants made by the state are contracts implying that the grantor will
not reassert title within the meaning of the contract clause of the Federal
Constitution. Compare Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (U.S. 1810). COOLEY,
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The decision even declared that the state was incapable of abdi-
cating this public trust by conveyance to a private corporation.
There may be some comfort to the state's position to be drawn
from that decision though distinctions in application have been
made in later cases and the logical implications of the Illinois
Central R.R. case are inconsistent with the settled system in those
states in which private ownership of the beds of navigable waters
by conveyance from the sovereign state has been recognized as a
matter of policy.6 3 Question will also be raised as to the com-
petency of the 1954 legislature to make a declaration of what the
1912 General Assembly actually intended.
Regardless of the question of constitutionality that the statute
poses, it may be given some effect as a legislative interpretation
of the state's policy as to submerged lands under navigable
waters when the court is called upon to re-examine the basic
soundness of the two cases the statute was designed to overrule.
Of great importance in connection with this subject is the
proposed deletion and repeal of that provision of the Consti-
tution of 1921 which prohibits the alienation of beds of navigable
waters, except for purposes of reclamation, and which guarantees
to the state the reservation of mineral rights on all property sold
by the state.64 In view of the decisions in the Duck Lake case and
California Co. v. Price, and because prior to 1921, there was no
express constitutional prohibition regarding the alienation of
the beds of navigable streams and no express provision reserving
to the state the minerals on lands sold by it, a way would be
opened for strong argument that there is no longer any impedi-
ment to perfecting title to the beds of navigable waters conveyed
by the state. This may follow from the emphasis placed in the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 380, n. 30 (Bruce's ed. 1931) states: "The soil under
navigable waters is held by the people of the State in trust for the common
use, and as a portion of their sovereignty, and any act concerning its use
affects the public welfare. The legislature cannot by irrepealable contract
convey such property in disregard of the public trust. Illinois Cen. R.R.
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387."
63. See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926). Compare
Alabama v. Texas, 74 Sup. Ct. 481 (1954) sustaining the power of Congress
through the Submerged Lands Act to dispose of property vested in Congress
without limitation. See Note, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 199 (1954).
64. This repeal will be effected if Act 758 proposing an amendment to
LA. CONST. Art IV, § 2, is adopted. The purpose of this constitutional amend-
ment was to ratify and validate the highway and building authority bond
issues authorized by La. Acts 1954, Nos. 5, 13. It is obvious that the omis-
sion of the language quoted in note 57 supra was not intentional. See also
page 101 infra. After this article went to press, it appears from the un-
official returns that the constitutional amendment was rejected by a close
vote.
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Price case on the constitutional provision referred to as the only
prohibition standing in the way of the acquisition by private
parties of the beds of navigable waters. Even if Act 727 of 1954
be sufficient to prevent future alienations of beds of navigable
waters, nothing is said therein concerning the non-alienability
of mineral rights on property conveyed by the state. If the min-
erals are not expressly reserved, danger exists that where the
state conveys property, not necessarily the beds of streams, lakes
or bayous, these valuable rights would be lost to the state. 5
Act 443 of 1954, amending R.S. 9:1101, adds the following
provision to the original section:
"All transfers and conveyances or purported transfers
and conveyances made by the state of Louisiana to any levee
district of the state of any navigable waters and the beds
and bottoms thereof are hereby rescinded, revoked and
canceled."
This statute does not by its terms seek to revoke transfers
of such lands where the rights of third persons are concerned
though the similar provision of Act 727, discussed above, is
intended to have that effect. It rather contemplates the situation
in which the land is held by a levee board under one of the
various state grants, the six-year prescriptive period of Act 62
of 1912 being inapplicable to that situation. So construed the
statute constitutes a valid revocation of legislative grants of pub-
lic lands and will clarify any uncertainty as to the authority of
the State Mineral Board to lease such lands for mineral develop-
ment.66
65. Cf. Sims v. State Mineral Board, 219 La. 342, 351, 53 So.2d 124, 127
(1951) where the court states: "Appellant, the mineral board, contends that
under Act 237 of 1924, as amended, LSA-RS 47:2189, when the sheriff adjudi-
cated the property to Poe, a sale, not a redemption, was consummated, and
that, when the patent was issued pursuant to this sale, a new title was
created, in which must be read the constitutional restriction that in all
sales of state property the minerals must be reserved. In our opinion it
is immaterial whether the adjudication be considered a sale or a redemp-
tion, for the article of the Constitution relied on provides that the minerals
shall be reserved except where the owner or other person having the right
to redeem may buy or redeem property sold or adjudicated to the state
for taxes. ...
"We do not, however, think that the judgment of the lower court was
correct insofar as it recognized the plaintiff Sims to be the owner of the
mineral rights in the oil, gas, and other minerals under the property."
66. As applied to lands transferred to the various levee boards by the
state, where the lands are still held by the levee boards and the rights of
no third parties have attached to such lands, it would be competent for the
state to revoke any grants made by it. Board of Commissioners of Caddo
Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1928); Atchafalaya
Land Co. v. F. B. Williams Co., 146 La. 1047, 84 So. 351 (1920); cf. State
ex rel. Fitzpatrick v. Grace, 187 La. 1028, 175 So. 656 (1937).
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Movable property-Storage tanks placed on land by some
one other than the owner declared movable property. Two dia-
metrically opposed decisions emanated from the Court of Appeal
for the Second Circuit on the question as to whether a gas tank,
placed upon the premises by a butane gas company, pursuant to
a contract with the owner of the realty to supply him with gas
for cooking and heating purposes, had become immobilized so
that the tank passed to a third purchaser of the realty.67 In
Holicer Gas Co. v. Wilson" the court held that the gas tank in
question had become an immovable under Articles 467 and 468
of the Civil Code, even though not placed on the realty by the
owner thereof. In Edwards v. S. & R. Gas Co., 9 the court re-
versed its position, holding that the tank retained its movable
character, so that the owner of the tank could remove it from
the premises after the sale of the realty to a third party. Lest
the court be inclined to follow the decision in the Holicer case,70
the legislature enacted Act 49 of 1954,"' which codifies the rule
announced in the Edwards case, to the effect that tanks, placed
on the land by a person who is not the owner of the land, for the
storage of liquefied gases or fertilizers, will retain their char-
acter as movables, and that the owner of the tanks will not be
affected by the sale of the land on which they have been placed.
" Trust Estates Act-List of trust fund investments amended.
The Trust Estates Act establishes a "legal list" of authorized
classes of securities and provides that unless otherwise stipulated
in the terms of the trust, or unless court authority for deviation
from the list is obtained, or unless the investment falls within
67. Edwards v. S. & R. Gas Co., 73 So.2d 590 (La. App. 1954); Holicer
Gas Co. v. Wilson, 45 So.2d 96 (La. App. 1950).
68. 45 So.2d 96 (La. App. 1950).
69. 73 So.2d 590 (La. App. 1954). In reversing its former stand, the court
said: "Our difference from the author of the Holicer opinion is first, the
tank was not truly an accessory to the fundus; second, it was not employed
in the service of the fundus, but in the service of the person who owned
the fundus; and third, it was not placed on the fundus by the owner of
both the fundus and the movable." Id. at 592.
70. Hardy, J., who rendered the opinion in the Holicer case, dissented
in the Edwards case, saying: "The opinion in the Holicer case expressed
the views of this court at the time, and I remain unchanged in my belief
of its soundness. ...
"I further strongly and emphatically disagree with the conclusion that
a gas system for use in furnishing fuel for cooking and heating in a dwell-
ing house is designed for the service of the owner and not for the service
and improvement of the building. Pursuing the same analogy as above
used, we might say that a bath tub is intended for the service and con-
venience of the owner and his guests rather than for the service and improve-
ment of the building. I respectfully dissent." 73 So.2d 590, 595 (La. App.
1954).
71. Tentatively incorporated as LA. R.S. 9:1106 (Supp. 1954).
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statutory provisions relative to a, joint investment fund, the
trustee shall invest the trust funds only in securities on the legal
list. By Act 236 of 1954 obligations issued or guaranteed by the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were
added to the authorized legal list of investments. 2
Domestic corporations-Specific authority to make donations
to corporations and organizations created and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable or educational purposes. Act 638
of 1954 adds a new section to the Revised Statutes specifically
authorizing domestic corporations, when authorized by the board
of directors or executive committee, to make donations to any
corporation, trust, fund or foundation, created or organized
exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes. No
part of the net earnings of the donee may inure to the benefit of
a shareholder of the donee and no substantial part of the activi-
ties may be "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting
to influence legislation."73 It is provided that a donation shall
not be authorized if the donee institution shall own more than
ten percent of the voting stock of the donor or one of its sub-
sidiaries. The additional section will modify the power of domestic
corporations unless otherwise provided in the charter. The act
contemplates that any existing authority under the general prin-
ciples of corporate law as to donations is not set aside by en-
acting: "The provisions of this Part shall not be construed as
interpreting the rights and powers of corporations as heretofore
existing." This latter provision was inserted to make it clear
that by enacting this affirmative authority there is no legislative
interpretation implied that the authority to make such donations
did not previously exist. It is likewise intended to avert any
attack on the act as an unconstitutional modification of existing
charters. The obvious purpose of the statute is to remove all
doubt as to the power of the corporate directors to make cor-
porate gifts for charitable, religious and educational purposes.
It seeks to avoid the possibility of stockholder attacks on such
corporate donations on the grounds that such donations are ultra
vires. Under the act it would not be necessary to show that the
donation would result in a direct benefit to the corporation.
While the courts have been liberal in sustaining corporate do-
72. La. Acts 1954, No. 236, amending LA. R.S. 9:2061 (1950).
73. La. Acts 1954, No. 638, adding LA. R.S. 9:2271.1 (Supp. 1954).
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nations of this type74 the large increases in the amounts of cor-
porate gifts for religious, educational and charitable purposes
make it likely that minority shareholders will be more prone to
question the validity of such substantial donations. 75  By this
enactment, Louisiana joins the large number of states enacting
specific statutes to make the authority absolutely clear.76 The
Louisiana statute meets the standard set for income tax deduc-
tions under both the new Internal Revenue Code and the former
law. 7 This legislation reflects a desirable social attitude toward
a form of corporate philanthropy which bears an intimate re-
lationship to the very maintenance of our free enterprise system
itself.
Trusts-Statutory recognition of the cy pres doctrine. The
"cy pres" doctrine, as applied to the law of charitable trusts,
means that when the settlor's purpose cannot be fulfilled because
it has become impossible or impracticable to do so, it will never-
theless be carried out as near as possible and give effect to the
trust.
78
In the case of Da Pontalba v. New Orleans,79 the plaintiff
sought to annul a donation made to the Ayuntamiento of New
74. See A. P, Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953),
67 I-ARV. L. REV. 343, 28 TULANE L. REV. 491 (1954). As to the existence of
implied restrictions upon the authority of corporations to make donations
and gifts, see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 228-31 (rev. ed. 1946); 6A FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 2938-40 (1950).
75. "Corporations have risen to sudden prominence in the field of philan-
thropy. Their 'gifts and contributions' as reported to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue leaped from a level of $30 million in 1936 and $31 million in 1939
to a plateau of over $200 million in every year since 1944, with the probability
that 1951 exceeded $300 million." ANDREWS, CORPORATE GIVING 15 (1952).
76. The state permissive legislation of this type is surveyed in id. at
233-39.
77. INT. REV. CODE § 170(c); formerly INT. REV. CODE, 26 U.S.C.A. § 23(q)
(Supp. 1953).
78. FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 1, § 1.00 (1950).
The term "ey pres," the author explains, is derived from the Norman French
"cy pres comme possible," meaning "as near as possible." The doctrine, the
author further points out, "arose so far back in antiquity that its origins
are obscure. It was known and used in Rome before Constantine and thus
was not an innovation of Christianity. A case applying the cy pres principle
appears in the Digest of Justinian. In the early part of the third century
a legacy was left to a city for the purpose of preserving the memory of
the donor by using the income to conduct yearly games. Such games being
illegal at that time, the question arose of what was to be done with the
legacy. The solution of Modestinus, a celebrated jurist, was as follows:
'Since the testator wished games to be celebrated which are not permitted,
it would be unjust that the amount which he has destined to that end
should go back to the heirs. Therefore, let the heirs and magnates of the
city be cited, and let an examination be made to ascertain how the trust
may be employed so that the memory of the deceased may be preserved
in some other and lawful manner.' Eventually the cy pres doctrine found
Its ways into French and also Spanish civil law." Id. at 3-4, § 1.02.
79. 3 La. Ann. 660 (1848). This case was decided under the Spanish
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Orleans on the grounds that the conditions under which the
donation had been made had failed. It appeared that the father
of the plaintiff had donated property on which he had built leper
hospitals and which he stipulated should continue to be used for
that purpose. The donation was unconditionally accepted and
applied to the contemplated use; but later, after the buildings
burned down, the property was turned into a cemetery, sub-
sequently sold and the proceeds deposited in the public treasury.
The plaintiffs, heirs of the donor, claimed these proceeds, claim-
ing the conditions of the donation had failed. It was held, how-
ever, that since the donation had not been made solely and
exclusively for the use mentioned, it did not fail upon the failure
of the donee to continue to use it for the purpose intended. Sim-
ilarly, in Succession of Vance, 0 the City of New Orleans sued
for a legacy which the court construed to have been made for
the benefit of the indigent insane, though it had been made to a
special charity named as the donee which, however, did not exist
at the time of the donor's death.8'
Interpreting these two cases, the Federal Court of Appeals in
Sickles v. New Orleans,8 2 after reviewing the authorities and the
civil law which was in effect at the time of the donation in the territory
of Louisiana. Cf. the language of the court, referring to earlier decisions,
in Board of Trustees v. Richardson, 216 La. 633, 644, 44 So.2d 321, 325 (1950),
to the effect that in a donation containing the stipulation that it was made
for religious purposes, the stipulation was merely indicative of the motive
for making the donation, and not a condition the nonfulfillment of which
would cause the donation to fall: "This holding is not only at variance
with our civil law, as hereinabove demonstrated, but is also not supported
by the authorities relied on by the author of the opinion and we will not,
therefore, follow it."
80. 39 La. Ann. 371, 2 So. 54 (1887).
81. Two other cases following the doctrine of Da Pontalba and Vance
cases are Hutchinson v. Tulane University of Louisiana, 171 La. 653, 131 So.
838 (1930) and Board of Trustees of Ruston Circuit, Methodist Episcopal
Church v. Rudy, 192 La. 200, 187 So. 549 (1939). In the Rudy case, the donor
executed a transfer of land to the church. The need arose, however, to
build a new church in a different location, and the trustees elected to sell
the property. This, the heirs of the donor opposed on the grounds that,
under Article 1559 of the Civil Code, the donation had fallen under the
resolutory condition thereof. Sustaining the judgment of the lower court
in favor of the donation, it was held that the stipulation was not a condition
contemplated by the article of the Civil Code and that the rule applicable
was that applied to donations of land for public use in which the donor
parts with his title and his heirs have no further interest in the property.
82. 80 Fed. 868 (5th Cir. 1897). In the course of the opinion the court
said: "The real beneficiaries to charitable donations are generally the un-
organized poor, and the administration of the charity is necessarily confided
to agents. If such charities are not properly administered, or by neglect
are allowed to lapse, the fault is not attributable to the beneficiaries, nor
always to the public, but generally to the bad judgment or neglect of ad-
ministrators. The state, as parens patriae, can and should protect all such
charities by legislation and through the courts, as is the universal rule In
civilized states .... Id. at 877-78.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
doctrines of both the civil and common law, held that the Lou-
isiana Civil Code was not intended to, and did not include, among
the donations subject to revocation, those made for charitable or
other eleemosynary purposes.83 Though these cases went no
further than to declare irrevocable donations or bequests for
charitable purposes, and though nothing was said concerning
the administration of the trust established where the purpose
for which they were made was no longer possible, these cases
indicate, at least, that Louisiana was not unfavorably disposed
toward the cy pres doctrine. A diametrically opposed decision
seems to have been rendered, however, by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Board of Trustees v. Richardson,84 where it was held
that a donation for religious purposes would be subject to revoca-
tion and dissolution under Article 1559 of the Civil Code, if the
conditions imposed by the donor that the property be used for
religious purposes were not complied with. So holding, the court
refused to follow and overruled its previous position announced
in Board of Trustees v. Rudy.85
This undesirable result has been remedied by the enactment
of Act 592 of 1954,86 whereby the cy pres doctrine is now made
a part of the general statutory law of Louisiana. Under its pro-
visions, where the circumstances have so changed since the
execution of a donation as to render it impractical or impossible
to comply literally with the terms thereof, adequate proceedings
are prescribed whereby the court may decree that the donation
be administered in such a manner to accomplish "as nearly as
practicable under existing conditions" the general purpose of the
bequest or donation. The statute contemplates a contradictory
hearing with the heirs and legatees of the decedent, upon the
filing of a petition by the trustee setting forth the facts and
circumstances which, in his opinion, render it impractical, im-
possible or illegal to comply with the terms of the donation or
trust, and the method in which he proposes to administer the
same. In rendering its judgment, however, the court is required
to give preference to proper suggestions, if any, offered by the
83. "Enough has been cited and said to show why we find that article
1559 Rev. Civ. Code, was not intended to, and does not, include among
donations liable to be revoked, those donations to pious uses which, other-
wise absolute and unconditional, merely specify or direct the particular
charity favored by the donee, and why we conclude that, under the recog-
nized jurisprudence of Louisiana, such donations are not revocable." Id,.
at 878.
84. 216 La. 633, 44 So.2d 321 (1950).
85. 192 La. 200, 187 So. 549 (1939).
86. Tentatively incorporated as LA. R.S. 9:2331 et seq. (Supp. 1954).
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heirs or legatees as to the method of administration. It cannot
in any case decree the invalidity of the bequest because the
conditions imposed cannot be complied with. The judgment,
which can only be appealed from suspensively and then only
when application is made within thirty days after the signing
thereof, protects the trustee from personal liability in his admin-
istration of the trust, and on proper showing that the adminis-
tration has been made in accordance with the judgment, the
trustee is entitled to a final discharge from all responsibility in
the premises.
Tax certificates-Requirement that certificate state whether
or not the current taxes have been paid. There is a statutory
requirement that no public officer shall convey real property
located within the City of New Orleans unless the state, parish,
municipal and levee district taxes due thereon, as well as the
past due charges for local improvements and assessments, are
paid.87 Payment must be made to appear by a tax certificate
showing the payment of the taxes and covering the research
period required by the statute.8 By Act 596 of 1954, the statute
was amended to require that the tax certificates issued in con-
nection with sales of real property shall indicate "whether or
not the current taxes have been paid." This added certification
should facilitate collection of current taxes when due and assist
in clarification of the facts necessary in any exact agreement as
to proration. Under the statute it would appear that taxes not
due would not have to be paid in the current year in which the
act is executed despite the added certification requirement.
Incorporeal rights-Assignments of accounts receivable to
be recorded in the conveyance records. In 1952 Louisiana adopted
an additional comprehensive method of making assignments of
accounts receivable. 89 By Act 725 of 1954 the provisions relative
to recordation of the statement of assignment were amended in
two minor respects: (1) in parishes of the state other than
Orleans Parish, the statement of assignment is to be recorded in
the conveyance records rather than in the Sale of Movables Book;
(2) the effective time of the assignment is when the statement
87. LA. R.S. 9:2921 (1950).
88. LA. R.S. 9:2922-2923 (1950).
89. La. Acts 1952, No. 293, p. 752, now LA. R.S. 9:3101-3110 (Supp. 1954),
known as the Louisiana Assignment of Accounts Receivable Law. The
statute is discussed In Louisiana Legislation of 1952, 13 LOUISIANA LAw
REVIEw 33-34 (1952).
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is "filed" rather than when the statement is "received" by the
recorder as formerly provided.
Privileges and mortgages-Ranking of laborer and material-
man's privilege clarified. Louisiana R.S. 9:4801 carried forward
into the revision the provisions of Section 1 of Act 298 of 1926,
as amended, ranking the laborer's and materialman's privilege
over a prior mortgage, unless the mortgage had been recorded
before the work or materials had been furnished, regardless of
the time when the contract for such work had been recorded.90
Although the statute did not specifically so provide, the
Supreme Court had held in the Hortman-Salmen case9' that
where a conventional mortgage to secure future advances had
been recorded before the labor or materials had been furnished,
the mortgage would prime the materialmen, even though the
advances had been made thereafter. It was possibly with the
intention to codify this holding that the legislature of 1952
amended R.S. 9:4801. Since the amendment provided that, where
the mortgage was given for the purpose of securing future ad-
vances in order for the mortgage to prime the privilege of the
materialmen it had to be recorded before any work or labor had
begun or material furnished, or before the recordation of the
contract for such labor or materials,9 2 the 1952 amendment re-
stricted the rule previously announced by the court.
The 1952 amendment also changed the existing law relative
to the rank of the vendor's privilege and that of the mortgage
creditor, because the requirement of recording the mortgage
prior to the recordation of a building contract where the mort-
gage was given to secure future loans was also required in the
90. La. Acts 1926, No. 298, § 1, p. 540, as amended, La. Acts 1946, No.
281, § 2, p. 843, substantially providing as follows: "Every contractor, ,.
workman, laborer or furnisher of material . . . who performs work or fur-
nishes materials for the erection . . . of any building . . . has a privilege
for the payment . . . of such work or labor performed, or materials . . .
furnished . . . upon the land and improvements on which the work or labor
has been done . . . , which privilege, if evidenced as herein provided, is
superior to all other claims against the land and improvements except
taxes or local assessments . . . or a bona fide vendor's privilege . . . or a
bona fide mortgage, provided said mortgage or vendor's privilege exists
and is recorded before the work or labor is begun or any material is fur-
nished."
91. Hortman-Salmen Co. v. White, 168 La. 1057, 123 So. 711 (1929).
92. LA. R.S. 9:4801 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 291, p. 750.
It is submitted that the amendment was unnecessary in view of the holding
of the court in Hortman-Salmen Co. v. White, 168 La. 1057, 123 So. 711
(1929), wherein a conventional mortgage recorded before work or labor had
begun or materials furnished was held to secure future advances made
thereafter with priority over the materialman's privilege arising subsequent
to the recordation of the mortgage.
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case of a vendor's privilege and mortgage.9 3 Under the amefid-
ment, therefore, if a building contract under which the labor or
materials to be furnished were recorded prior to the recordation
of a vendor's mortgage, the materialmen would prime the mort-
gagee even though no labor or materials had actually been
furnished prior to the recordation of the mortgage, which, to say
the least, is illogical.94
This hiatus was resolved by Act 477 of 1954 which again
amends R.S. 9:4801, restoring the original intent of the section
regarding the rank between the materialmen and the vendor,
and clarifying the original legislative intent regarding the rank
of any other conventional mortgage given simply to secure future
advances for construction purposes. The original one-sentence
provision has been broken down into four subsections: Subsection
A grants the privilege to the laborer and materialman, Subsection
B ranks the materialman's privilege with respect to (1) taxes and
local assessments for public improvements, if any, and (2) the
vendor's privilege or mortgage. Here some editorial changes
were made: instead of referring to the vendor's privilege as
"whether arising from a sale, or arising from a sale and resale
to and from a regularly organized homestead or building and
loan association," the idea has been expressed in a separate
sentence.95 Subsection C embodies the substance of the 1952
amendment and provides that where a mortgage note has been
executed for the purpose of securing advances to be made in the
future, and the mortgage has been recorded before the work or
labor has begun or material furnished, the amount of the ad-
vances subsequently made will be secured by the mortgage with
priority over the privilege of the materialmen. Subsection D
makes it clear that the laborer's privilege primes the rights of
mortgagees and vendors in all cases.
Chattel mortgages-Bona fide retail purchaser from dealer
of motor vehicles, chattel, property or merchandise not subject
93. ". . . provided said mortgage or vendor's privilege exists and is re-
corded before the work or labor is begun or any material is furnished or
any building contract placed of record.... ." LA. R.S. 9:4801 (1950), as
amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 291, p. 750. See Louisiana Legislation of 1952,
13 LOUISIANA LAW RvixEw 21, 35-37 (1952).
94. Cf. Louisiana Legislation of 1952, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 21, 36
(1952).
95. The language has been clarified to read as follows: "For the purposes
of this Sub-Section, a vendor's privilege or a mortgage resulting from a
sale and resale to and from a regularly organized homestead or building
and loan association also constitutes a vendor's privilege or mortgage, re-
spectively, within the intendment of this Sub-Section." LA. R.S. 9:4801 (1950),
as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 477.
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to chattel mortgage lien. Acts 480 and 481 of 1954 amend the
Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act and the Chattel Mortgage
Act by adding new provisions that are designed to protect the
purchaser who buys from a dealer in good faith without knowl-
edge of the existence of a chattel mortgage.9 If he does not in
fact know of the existence of the chattel mortgage, the bona fide
purchaser at retail97 from a licensed dealer, wholesaler or retailer
will hold the property free of the chattel mortgage lien where
the holder of the mortgage expressly or impliedly consents to
the chattel being placed on sale in the usual course of business.
The acts provide that such consent is implied whenever the
mortgagor is a licensed wholesaler, retailer or dealer and may
not be negatived by any clause in the mortgage. From the lan-
guage of the acts, it is made clear that the purpose is to protect
only retail purchasers for individual or business use and that the
chattel mortgage may be enforced against "group or bulk pur-
chasers" whether such purchasers are in good faith or not.
The amended acts overturn the leading case of Palmisano v.
Louisiana Motor Car Co.95 and the subsequent case of Commercial
Securities Co. v. Luke 9 They accept the view that the purchaser
96. La. Acts 1954, No. 480, amending LA. R.S. 32:710 (1950); La. Acts 1954,
No. 481, amending LA. R.S. 9:5354 (1950).
97. "For purposes of this Section a bona fide retail purchaser in actual
good faith shall be deemed to be any person, firm, partnership or corporation
purchasing a motor vehicle, chattel or merchandise for individual or business
use and not for resale from a licensed dealer, wholesaler or retailer, who does
not in fact know of a chattel mortgage existing upon the property pur-
chased .. " La. Acts 1954, No. 481, amending LA. R.S. 9:5354 (1950); La. Acts
1954, No. 480, amending LA. R.S. 32:710 (1950).
98. In Palmisano v. Louisiana Motor Car Co., 166 La. 416, 117 So. 446
(1928), plaintiff instituted proceedings by executory process under the
Chattel Mortgage Act against new automobiles which had been sold by de-
fendant to intervenors. Intervenors contended that plaintiff was estopped
from so proceeding because when he sold to defendant, a dealer, he knew
that the automobiles were to be placed on the dealer's floor for sale, and
that, having such knowledge, the said plaintiff mortgagee in effect agreed
that it might be sold free of the mortgage, and that he should look to the
proceeds of the sale in the hands of the dealer. The court held that under
those circumstances there was no estoppel and the chattel mortgage could be
enforced against the innocent purchaser.
Estoppel or waiver might be found in a specific agreement consenting to
the sale of property subject to a chattel mortgage. Security Credit Corp. v.
Menefee Motor Co., 14 La. App. 1, 129 So. 174 (1930), but not in mere knowl-
edge that the car will be exhibited and sold by a dealer in the usual course
of business. Commercial Securities Co. v. Luke, 54 So.2d 893 (La. App. 1951).
99. 54 So.2d 893 (La. App. 1951). A used car dealer purchased a car,
placed a chattel mortgage on it for the purchase money paid to the vendor,
exhibited it for sale on his used car lot, and subsequently sold it to a pur-
chaser who, in turn, transferred it to other purchasers. The dealer did not
remit the money to the mortgagee. Held, the fact that the mortgagee knew the
car would be exhibited for sale by dealer did not operate as estoppel or
waiver and mortgagee could enforce the chattel mortgage lien against the
purchaser.
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from a dealer should not be bound by constructive notice of a
properly recorded chattel mortgage.100
As applied to movable property constituting stock in trade
other than motor vehicles, the amendment appears to be largely
unnecessary. Legislation passed in 1948 and clarified in 1950
provides in effect that the chattel mortgage lien ceases to exist
as to property sold from stocks of merchandise in retail, whole-
sale or manufacturing establishments. 101 The 1948 and 1950 pro-
visions, however, could not now be construed to cover motor
vehicles covered by the Certificate of Title Act and there are, no
doubt, additional factual situations involving mortgages of chat-
tels not within the terms of the Chattel Mortgage Act as it existed
prior to Act 481 of 1954.
As applied to motor vehicles, the adoption of the Motor
Vehicle Certificate of Title Act' 02 lessened considerably the haz-
ards to which purchasers from used car dealers may be exposed
when chattel mortgage financing is involved. Normally, the
notation of the chattel mortgage on the face of the certificate of
title would bring actual notice of the existence of the chattel
mortgage to the attention of the alert buyer. But mortgages may
also be given by automobile dealers on vehicles for which no
certificate of title has been applied for under floor plan loans.
Under the statute making mortgage to secure floor plan loans
effective against third persons from the time they are entered
in the register of floor plan mortgage by the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, there is continued possibility of good faith pur-
chase of mortgaged automobiles under which the purchaser's
100. As stated in a leading case in opposition to the doctrine of construc-
tive notice, Boice v. Finance & G. Corp., 127 Va. 563, 570, 102 S.E. 591, 593
(1920): "[i1t would be unreasonable to require a purchaser to determine
what could be mortgaged and what could not. To require an examination
of the record for liens in such cases would break up business, and indeed
be an embargo on legitimate trade. Capital must seek a more substantial
security for its protection. Otherwise it were better that the few should
suffer than the general public, who had been lured into purchasing from a
dealer who has been intrusted with the indicia of ownership."
101. La. Acts 1948, No. 474, p. 1320, and La. Acts 1950, No. 515, p. 940,
now LA. R.S. 9:5351 (1950), provides in part "In the case of stocks of mer-
chandise, including those in retail, wholesale and manufacturing establish-
ments, as well as other movable property in bulk, but changing in specifics,
the effect of the mortgage shall cease as to all articles disposed of by the
mortgagor up to the time of foreclosure but shall attach to the purchases
made to supply their place and to other after acquired additions to the
original stock of goods, merchandise or other things In bulk ordinarily mort-
gaged to secure the debt."
102. LA. R.S. 32:701-721 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 121, p.
290. See Comment, Louisiana Vehicle Certificate of Title Act, 11 LOUISIANA
LAW REviEw 450 (1951); Louisiana Legislation of 1952, 13 LOUISIANA LAW
RviEw 90-92 (1952).
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rights would be subordinate to the rights of the mortgagee. 0 3
These statutes reflect desirable policy and are in harmony with
analogies to be drawn from the Civil Code. 0 4 Act 480, amending
the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Law, reflects undesirable
haste in draftsmanship in including "chattels, property or mer-
chandise" as subject to chattel mortgages while the basic statute
it amends applies only to motor vehicles. Similarly, Act 481 be-
comes confusing by including motor vehicle chattel mortgages
which are no longer within the scope of the chattel mortgage
law. Since, however, the two statutes duplicate the same pro-
visions the legislative intent is made apparent to cover the entire
field of permissible Louisiana chattel mortgages and no harm is
done by the lack of technical accuracy.
Chattel mortgages-Default in payments on mortgage debt
following unauthorized removal made evidence of fraudulent
intent to defeat mortgage. Act 391 of 1954 amends the Chattel
Mortgage Act to provide that when mortgaged property is re-
moved from the state without consent of the mortgagee, the
failure of the mortgagor to pay, within thirty days after such
removal, any amount that is past due or that becomes due during
the said thirty-day period "shall constitute evidence of fraudulent
intent to defeat the mortgage."1 5  The act does not specifically
use the term prima facie evidence, but that interpretation is
clearly implied and it would follow that the defaulting mortgagor
could, in a proper case, rebut the presumption from his default
by showing a lack of any actual fraudulent intent. If default
occurs within the thirty days following the removal, the statute
does not provide that the mortgagor must be in default for a
period of thirty days for the presumption of fraudulent intent to
attach. If, e.g., default occurred on the twentieth day after un-
authorized removal from the state, the effect of the statute would
be operative within ten days from such default, as the thirty-
day period is to be calculated from the date of removal from the
state. The statute is silent as to defaults occurring after the
thirty-day period following removal, so any such subsequent
default would be no evidence of fraudulent intent to defeat the
103. LA. R.S. 32:702, 710 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 121, p. 290.
The method of executing and recording chattel mortgages on motor vehicles
is exclusively governed by the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law. LA. R.S.
32:710 (1950).
104. Cf. Arts. 1922, 1923, LA. CIvm CODE of 1870. See Franklin, Security of
Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide
Purchase, 6 TULANE L. REV. 589 (1932).
105. La. Acts 1954, No. 391, amending LA. R.S. 9:5359 (1950).
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mortgage. The act amends only the Chattel Mortgage Law and
does not amend the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Law.10 6
As a consequence, the presumption of fraud from default in pay-
ments following unauthorized removal from the state would have
no application to motor vehicles.
106. The Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Law provides the exclusive
method of executing and recording chattel mortgages on motor vehicles.
The Chattel Mortgage Law insofar as it deals with criminal penalties for
acts to defeat chattel mortgages is repealed by that law. See State v. Bowie,
221 La. 41, 58 So.2d 415 (1952). The applicable statute as to motor vehicles is
LA. R.S. 32:710(G) (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 121, p. 290, La. Acts
1954, No. 480.
